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CRIMINAL LAW - ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF DE-
FENDANT'S REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO BLOOD-ALCOHOL
TEST DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVI-
LEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. South Dakota v. Nev-
ille, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
Defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer test' following his
arrest for driving while intoxicated. Under South Dakota's refusal-as-
evidence statute,2 a defendant's refusal to submit to the test constitutes
admissible evidence at trial. The trial court found the statute unconsti-
tutional3 and granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence
of his refusal.4 The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed5 since it
found that the statute violated both the federal and state privileges
against self-incrimination.6 To settle the growing confusion,7 the
1. Defendant was informed of the state's implied consent law and was advised of his
Miranda rights. The arresting officers, though, failed to warn him that evidence
of his refusal could be used against him at trial. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723,
724 (S.D. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983), on remand, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.
1984) (since officers failed to advise Neville of the consequences of refusal, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota suppressed evidence of his refusal on due pro-
cess grounds). For the Court's treatment of the defendant's contention that the
statute was fundamentally unfair under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, see Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923-24; see also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(1976) (defendant's silence following Miranda warnings may not be used to im-
peach testimony); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) (prejudicial impact
exceeds any probative value of evidence relating to pretrial silence).
2. The statute provides that: "If a person refuses to submit to chemical analysis of
his blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance, . . . and that person subse-
quently stands trial for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, ...
such refusal may be admissible into evidence at the trial." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 32-23-10.1. (Supp. 1983). Under Maryland law, refusal to submit to a
chemical analysis is not admissible into evidence at trial. See MD. CTs. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-309 (1984).
3. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723, 724 (S.D. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983). As
further support for its ruling, the state court recognized that the arresting officers
had failed to advise the defendant of the possible use of the refusal at his subse-
quent trial and, in addition, found the refusal irrelevant to the issues before the
court. Neville, 312 N.W.2d at 724.
4. Defendant informed the officers that he had been drinking "close to one case" by
himself, South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 919 n.3 (1983), and that his
license had been revoked in a previous driving while intoxicated conviction. Id
at 918.
5. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723, 724 (S.D. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
6. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723, 725-26 (S.D. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
"No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V; cf. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9 ("No person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself."). In
1964, the Constitution's fifth amendment privilege was made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
7. Compare Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1977) (refusal evidence inadmis-
sible because of its testimonial nature) with Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514
(9th Cir. 1969) (refusal admissible because it is not a testimonial statement), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 966 (1970) and People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55
Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966) (refusal evidence, as circumstantial evidence of conscious-
ness of guilt, non-testimonial in nature).
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Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. In South Dakota v. Nev-
ie, 8 the Court reversed and found the defendant's refusal to be an act
uncoerced by the arresting officers9 and thus outside the protection of
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Challenges to refusal-as-evidence statutes arise from the privilege
contained in the fifth amendment' 0 that protects individuals against
compulsory self-incrimination."' This constitutional privilege' 2 had
its genesis in the political and religious struggle involving the ecclesias-
tical courts in early England.' 3 While the external policies that moti-
vated the colonists to include this privilege against self-incrimination in
the Bill of Rights remain rather vague and contradictory,' 4 it is clear
that the privilege protects the core values of safeguarding mental free-
dom15 and protecting the respect for the "inviolability of the human
8. 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
9. Id at 923. On remand, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the officer's
failure to advise Neville of the consequences of refusal was a denial of due pro-
cess. Accordingly, the court suppressed the evidence of his refusal. State v. Nev-
ille, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984); see supra notes 1 and 3.
10. For the text of the fifth amendment privilege, see supra note 6.
11. "The element of compulsion or involuntariness was always an ingredient of the
right and, before the right existed, of protests against incriminating interroga-
tions." South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 922 (1983) (quoting W. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 328 (1968)); accord Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976). The essence of the privilege lies in the testimonial na-
ture of the proscribed compulsion; both the elements of compulsion and evidence
of a testimonial nature are essential. Id; see also Note, Self Incrimination." Testi-
monial vs. Non-Testimonial Evidence, 43 DEN. L.J. 501, 504-06 (1966) (quoting 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2263 (McNaughton rev.
1961)) (historically the privilege deplored the extraction from the accused of an
admission of guilt through the employment of legal process).
12. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490 (1944) (fifth amendment is em-
bodied in the "fundamental law of the land") (quoting Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886)
(privilege is a fundamental part of American sociological and legal ideology and
any violation is contrary to the principles of free government).
13. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859,
927 (1979) (Professor Wigmore traced the history of the privilege against self-
incrimination to the "protracted political and religious struggle against the ecclesi-
astical courts, the Star Chamber, and the ex officio oath required of persons
summoned before those institutions .. "); cf. Pittman, The Colonial and Consti-
tutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In America, 21 VA. L.
REV. 763, 775 (1935) (the privilege in America resulted from colonial misrule and
the Puritan experience). See generally J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2250 (dis-
cussing historical perspective of the privilege).
14. See Pittman, supra note 13, at 763. An expansive summary enumerates seven
policies reflected in the privilege, the most relevant of which are: '[olur unwilling-
ness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt;. . . our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individ-
ual balance' . . . ; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality... ;
[and] our distrust of self-deprecatory statements." Murphy v. Waterfront Comm.,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted).
15. Mental freedom is central to the privilege. See Arenella, Schmerber and the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination. A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 41-42
(1982); Grano, supra note 13, at 933-37.
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personality." 6
The fifth amendment privilege has never been accorded a prophy-
lactic effect' 7 because the protection granted to the accused does not
encompass all incriminatory evidence. It is an individual's mental pri-
vacy upon which the state absolutely may not intrude.' 8 In a decision
consistent with this theory, the Court in Schmerber v. California '" de-
clared that the inspection of body evidence, not of a testimonial or
communicative nature,2" was outside the scope of the privilege.2'
Schmerber held that the state may compel a suspect to submit to a
blood-alcohol test.22  In a controversial statement, however, the
Schmerber Court further stated that this compulsion may lead to una-
voidable testimonial byproducts included within fifth amendment pro-
tection. 23 This statement has led to diverse opinions among lower
courts that have interpreted its meaning with regard to the admissibility
of refusal evidence.
24
A minority of courts have found the refusal-as-evidence procedure
unconstitutional. 25 The refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test was
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
17. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966) (noting that the privilege
has never been afforded its full scope); South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916,
920, 923 n.15 (1983).
18. Of paramount importance is the moral precept of mental freedom and the right of
each individual to a "private enclave" free from government intrusion. United
States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). For identification of mental privacy as the primary
value the fifth amendment seeks to protect, see Arenella, supra note 15, at 41-42
(Schmerber assumes that intrusion upon an individual's mental domain offends
human independence and liberty more than intrusions upon the individual's
body).
19. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
20. Id at 761. The Court upheld the constitutionality of state-compelled blood tests
that provide physical evidence not implicating defendant's testimonial capacities.
Id. at 765. The Court likened the evidence obtained from the test to that obtained
from fingerprints, photographs, and measurements. Id at 764. By contrast, Jus-
tice Brennan considered assertive conduct to be testimonial in nature, thus falling
within the privilege. Id. at 763-64.
21. The Supreme Court has yet to define the precise contours of the fifth amendment
privilege. See supra note 17.
22. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
23. Id. at 765-66 n.9. The statement is confusing because the first half of the footnote
indicates that the state must forego any byproducts of the compulsion to take the
test that may be deemed testimonial in nature. The second half of the footnote,
though, indicates the propriety of analyzing the severity of the intrusion in deter-
mining the presence of compulsion prior to determining the testimonial nature of
the statement.
24. Counsel in Schmerber failed to preserve for appeal the question of the admissibil-
ity of a defendant's unlawful refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test. Evidence
of the refusal was admitted without objection. The Schmerber Court, recognizing
that the issue would arise again, intimated that general fifth amendment princi-
ples would apply. Id
25. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981), rev'd. 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983). Some
courts have focused primarily upon the testimonial nature of the refusal. See, e.g..
Gay v. City of Orlando, 202 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla. 1967) (refusal was a testimonial
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construed as an unavoidable byproduct of the compulsion to take the
test. Unlike body evidence, refusal evidence was considered a "tacit or
overt expression and communication of the defendant's thoughts."26
Most courts, though, have declared the refusal evidence admissible
on one of three theoretical bases. The courts espousing the first theory
ignored Schmerber's equation of assertive conduct with testimonial evi-
dence,27 and found refusals to be physical in nature. 8 This refusal evi-
dence was characterized as circumstantial evidence of conduct
indicative of a defendant's consciousness of guilt29 and, therefore, be-
yond the scope of fifth amendment protection. The second theory per-
mitting admission of the refusal emphasized the absence of a
constitutional right to refuse to submit to this test. Accordingly, these
courts characterized the admission of a refusal as a legitimate statutory
condition placed upon a matter of legislative grace.3 ° A final theory
supporting the majority outcome focused upon the lack of compulsion
inherent in the imposition of the choice between submitting to a simple
blood-alcohol test or having a refusal admitted into evidence. 3'
byproduct falling within the privilege); State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212
N.W.2d 863 (1973) (refusal relevant only in its testimonial aspect); State v. Jack-
son, 637 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1418 (1983) (refusal testimonial
in nature); Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1977) (refusal evidence commu-
nicative and testimonial in nature).
26. Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tex. 1977); State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d
723, 726 (S.D. 1981), rev'd 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983); Note, Constitutional Limitations
on the Taking of Body Evidence, 78 YALE L.J. 1074, 1082-85 (1969) (evidence
considered inferior, unduly prejudicial, and relevant only in its testimonial aspect,
i.e., the fear that it will provide evidence of the suspect's guilt).
27. The Schmerber Court characterized a nod or shake of the head as equivalent to
spoken words because both are communicative acts. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761
n.5; see supra note 20.
28. See State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981) (Wolman, J., dissenting), rev'd,
103 S. Ct. 916 (1983); see also Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969)
(refusal to submit to a blood test not a testimonial statement), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 966 (1970); People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr.
393 (1966) (refusal not testimonial in nature) (citing People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d
529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966)), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967);
State v. Dugas, 252 La. 345, 211 So. 2d 285 (1968) (refusal to give bodily evidence
admissible), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
29. In People v. Ellis, the seminal case for introducing refusal evidence, Chief Justice
Traynor of the Supreme Court of California emphasized the absence of a consti-
tutional right to refuse in these situations. Analogizing this evidence to escape
from custody, false alibi, flight, suppression of evidence, and tacit admissions, he
found the refusal to be circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt of a non-
testimonial nature. People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1966).
30. See, e.g., Welch v. District Court of Vt., 594 F.2d 903, 905 (2d Cir. 1979) (placing
conditions on a statutory right to refuse is constitutional); State v. Welch, 136 Vt.
442, 443, 394 A.2d 1115, 1116 (1978) (right to refuse is statutory in nature, with no
constitutional premise); State v. Brean, 136 Vt. 147, 152, 385 A.2d 1085, 1088
(1978) (legislature granted more "protection" than constitutionally required and
therefore may properly condition its exercise).
31. People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1978).
While finding the refusal to be testimonial, the court held that it was admissible,
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In South Dakota v. Neville, 32 the Supreme Court relied on this fi-
nal theory and held that a suspect's refusal to take a breathalyzer test
was not an act coerced by the police officers.3 3 The Neville Court noted
the frequency of accidents involving drunk drivers34 and the resulting
compelling state interest in highway safety.35 The statutory power to
refuse 3 6 was characterized as an effort to avoid violent confrontations
between the police and recalcitrant inebriates. 37 The admission of re-
fusal evidence, along with the one year revocation of driving privileges,
was deemed a legitimate legislative penalty for refusing to submit to a
lawfully imposed test.38 Furthermore, while the majority seemed to
favor the characterization of refusal evidence as physical in nature,
39
the Neville Court recognized the difficult gradations in the responses of
suspects," and therefore declined to base its decision on that theory.4
Instead, the Court focused upon the absence of the compulsion ingredi-
ent and the values triggering the protections of the fifth amendment.42
As a result, the Court left the testimonial/physical evidence distinction
elusively vague.
The Neville Court found that the state never actually compelled
regardless of whether it was testimonial, as long as the defendant was not com-
pelled to refuse to take the test. Id. at 107, 385 N.E.2d at 587, 412 N.Y.S.2d at
849.
32. 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
33. fd at 923.
34. Id at 920; see also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) (number of
highway fatalities attributable to alcohol consumption are comparable to wartime
fatalities).
35. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 920 (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1979)).
36. A distinction is made between the "power" of a suspect to refuse to submit to the
breathalyzer test versus the "right" to so refuse. The State argued that the suspect
had the power to refuse under state law, but had no absolute or constitutional
right to refuse. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916; see People v.
Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1978).
37. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 921. Police have two measures for dealing with non-coopera-
tion: (1) to admit the refusal into evidence; or, more frequently, (2) the use of
force. Note, supra note 26, at 1082.
38. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 921. By characterizing the admission of refusal evidence as a
legitimate condition upon a statutory privilege, the Court thus recognized the sec-
ond theory in the majority position. See supra note 30.
39. Justice O'Connor stated that the Court found considerable force in the analogies
to flight and suppression of evidence made by Chief Justice Traynor. Neville, 103
S. Ct. at 921-22; see supra note 29. The Court thus favors the theory characteriz-
ing refusals as physical in nature as opposed to the testimonial evidence theory
propounded by the minority jurisdictions.
40. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 922 (difficult to distinguish between physical and testimonial
evidence).
41. Id. at 921-22.
42. Id at 923. In sum, the Court recognized all three theories permitting the admis-
sion of refusal evidence. It chose, however, to rest its decision on the third theory,
which emphasized the absence of coercion in the state's action. For a discussion
of the policies behind the fifth amendment privilege, see supra note 14 and accom-
panying text.
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the suspect to refuse to take the test,4 3 but instead offered him a choice
between submitting to the test or having his refusal admitted into evi-
dence. While recognizing that the existence of a choice does not neces-
sarily obviate the compulsion inquiry," the Neville Court nevertheless
discovered no inherent compulsion in the state's offer of a choice be-
tween submitting to the simple, painless breathalyzer test or having the
refusal admitted into evidence. 5 Moreover, the Court found no hin-
drance of fifth amendment values46 in offering the suspect this choice,
albeit a difficult one, 47 and thus indicated that the refusal evidence
was outside the protection of the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination.48
The Neville decision represents an attempt to allay certain fifth
amendment misconceptions generated by the often quoted footnote in
Schmerber.4' A minority of jurisdictions, finding the refusal as evi-
dence procedure unconstitutional, based their analyses on the first half
of the footnote.5 These courts found the coercion necessary to trigger
the protections of the fifth amendment privilege in the state's ability to
force a suspect to submit to a blood-alcohol test.5 Thus, while the state
did not compel the suspect to refuse to take the test, it forced him to
make a choice. According to these courts and certain commentators,
the state cannot lawfully impose this decision upon the defendant be-
cause the fifth amendment "protects people from being put to certain
choices."52
The Neville Court, however, emphasized the second half of the
43. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923.
44. Id at 922. Some choices are clearly proscribed by the fifth amendment values.
The choice imposed by the "cruel trilemma" certainly offends fifth amendment
policies. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
45. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923.
46. In contrast to the prohibited choices imposed by the cruel trilemma of self-incrim-
ination, perjury, or contempt, the choice of whether to submit to a severely painful
test, or to submit to a test that violated a suspect's religious beliefs, the state may
offer a suspect the choice of submitting to a blood-alcohol test or having his re-
fusal used against him at trial without offending fifth amendment values. Id.
47. Id at 923.
48. Id
49. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765-66 n.9 (1966). For a discussion of the
two subparts of the footnote, see supra note 23.
50. Minority jurisdictions emphasized the following statement that: "If [the state]
wishes to compel persons to submit to such attempts to discover evidence, the
State may have to forego the advantage of any testimonial products of administer-
ing the test .... ." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765-66 n.9 (emphasis in original).
51. The refusal evidence was thus deemed an "unavoidable by-product" of compel-
ling a person to submit to the test. Id Given the initial compulsion to submit to
the test, these courts indicate that anything the suspect says that may be character-
ized as testimonial must be excluded as a byproduct of this compulsion.
52. The fifth amendment serves to protect persons from being forced to choose be-
tween serving as the instruments of their own demise or being penalized for refus-
ing to do so. See Westen & Mandell, To Talk to Balk, or to Lie.- The Emerging
Fifth Amendment Doctrine of the "Preferred Response, " 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521,
522 (1982).
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Schmerber footnote53 in analyzing whether the severity of the non-tes-
timonial procedures produced testimonial byproducts violative of the
fifth amendment. In disregarding the testimonial/physical evidence
distinction, the Court recognized the non-threatening nature of the
breathalyzer test.54 It reasoned that because the test is so safe and pain-
less, the proferred choice was not among those prohibited by the fifth
amendment, and hence would not hinder its underlying values.5 The
Court recognized, however, that the privilege may bar refusal evidence
if the proferred alternative is a test so "painful, dangerous, or severe, or
so violative of religious beliefs, that almost inevitably a person would
prefer 'confession.' "56 The Neville Court thus took a position regard-
ing the two instances represented by these government-imposed
choices,57 but failed to provide clear guidance as to what other choices
may collide with the fifth amendment.
The Neville decision may signal a new direction in the Supreme
Court's analysis of fifth amendment cases. Instead of merely relying
upon difficult testimonial/physical evidence distinctions, the Court will
apparently balance the interest of the state against the severity of any
infringement upon the individual defendant's interests. This balancing
analysis prevails throughout Neville. At the outset, in discussing the
tragic frequency of drunk-driving accidents,58 the Court recognized a
compelling state interest in highway safety.59 The opinion then focused
on the invididual's interests represented by the fifth amendment core
values of mental freedom6 ° and an entirely adversarial, as opposed to
inquisitorial, system of justice.6 Having recognized the interests in-
volved, the Court viewed the coercion issue as depending on the degree
or severity of the non-testimonial procedures in light of the diminished
scope of the fifth amendment privilege.62
In this respect, Neville may act as a harbinger of a burden-balanc-
ing model 63 in determining the true scope of the fifth amendment privi-
53. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765-66 n.9 ("Indeed, there may be circumstances in which
the pain, danger or severity of an operation would almost inevitably cause a per-
son to prefer confession to undergoing the 'search'.
54. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
56. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 922-23; Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 n.9. This choice was
likened to the penultimate evil of the cruel trilemma created by the ex officio oath
in the ecclesiastical courts. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 922-23.
57. The first instance is the Neville scenario in which no constitutional right was bur-
dened because none was exercised. The second instance is the choice imposed by
the historical evil of the cruel trilemma.
58. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 920; see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
59. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 920; see supra note 35.
60. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 920; see supra notes 15-16 & 18 and accompanying text.
61. An adversarial system of justice, with a fair state-individual balance, requires the
state to employ its own independent efforts to produce evidence against a suspect.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 17.
63. For the argument that the Court has previously employed a balancing analysis in
19841
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lege. 6 This model is necessary for the development of a "coherent
normative theory"65 explaining why people are protected from being
put to certain choices.66 Until this model is clearly delineated, confu-
sion and unpredictability will persist among the lower courts in fifth
amendment law, and these courts will continue to "balance without a
scale."67
Richard Kelley Reed
an ad hoc, covert manner, see Arenella, supra note 15, at 52-56. The absence of
clear historical purposes and values behind the fifth amendment renders the de-
velopment of this model difficult.
64. According to this model, if a court determines that the state's interest in compel-
ling the choice is outweighed by the costs to the individual's privilege, then the
proffer of this choice violates the fifth amendment. Id. at 53-54 n. 118.
65. Id at 38.
66. Id at 56.
67. Id.
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